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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/appellant, Medical Recovery Services, LLC, ("MRS") appeals from the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum 
Decision and Order RE: Appeal both affirming the default judgments entered by the magistrate 
court on April 13, 2012, May 29,2012 and June 18, 2012. This appeal addresses the Magistrate 
Court's refusal to award the amount of $350.00 in attorney's fees which the appellees agreed 
to pay by contract with Community Care, who was the original service provider. The 
magistrate court refused to award the contractually agreed upon attorney's fees under an 
improper and unconstitutional interpretation of I.C § 26-2229A(4). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
As each of the three cases appealed from have the same exact course of proceedings 
and same exact documents filed, MRS has included only those documents pertaining to 
defendants Stephanie and Jason Strawn in the record. On February 27,2012, April 16, 2012 
and May 2, 2012, MRS filed complaints in each of the matters appealed from seeking to recover 
amounts due on open accounts and for services provided.1 On April 10, 2012, May 23,2012 
and June 12, 2012, MRS filed for entry of default judgment seeking $350 as attorney's fees 
based on contractual provisions with the original service provider in which the defendants 
agreed to pay $350 as attorney's fees. 2 On April 13, 2012, May 29, 2012 and June 18,2012 the 
1 R Vol. I, p. 04. 
2 R Vol. I, p. 10. 
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magistrate court struck the $350 attorney's fee amount contained in the proposed default 
judgment and awarded an amount of attorney's fees equal to the principal.3 On April 17, 2012, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration specifically identifying the express language of the 
contract in which the defendants agreed to pay $350 as attorney's fees.4 On April 20, 2012, the 
Magistrate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On May 30,2012 and July 6,2012, 
Plaintiff filed Notices of Appeal.s Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Consolidate on July 6, 2012 
based on the facts that each case followed the same legal and procedural posture and dealt 
with the identical legal analysis. On August 14, 2012 the District Court entered an Order 
Consolidating Cases.6 Plaintiff filed its Amended Notice of Appeal on August 28, 2012.7 On 
September 12, 2012, MRS filed its Brief on Appeal arguing that the Magistrate Court had 
committed reversible error by failing to award contractual attorney's fees and had improperly 
and unconstitutionally misinterpreted I.e. § 26-2229A{4}.8 On November 8,2012, the District 
Court entered the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Appeal9 wherein that Court correctly 
reasoned that MRS was entitled to collect the contractual attorney's fees lI[b]arring any other 
kind of specific statutory preciusion. lIlo The District Court further correctly held that I.e. § 26-
2229A{4} prohibits collection agencies from collecting any charges or expenses incidental to the 
3 R Vol. I, p. 14-15. 
4 R Vol. I, p. 01. 
S R Vol. I, p. 19. 
6 R Vol. I, p. 26. 
7 R Vol. I, p. 29. 
B R Vol. I, p. 33. 
9 R Vol. I, p. 45. 
10 R Vol. I, p. 49. 
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principal amount but that "[c]reditors who are not licensed collection agencies are not subject 
to the same provision."ll However, the District Court then improperly concluded that because 
"MRS has failed to overcome the presumption that I.C § 26-2229A(4) is constitutional," the 
magistrate court's default judgment is affirmed.12 MRS filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 
November 21, 2012 arguing that the District Court has unconstitutionally misapplied I.C § 26-
2229A(4) because the contractual fee for attorney's fees in this case is not a fee incidental to 
the principal but is part of the principal obligation.13 MRS argued that because the fee provision 
it is seeking to enforce is contained in the original contract between the original service 
provider and debtors, that contract is not subject to I.C § 26-2229A(4). On January 17,2013, 
the District Court denied MRS' Motion for Reconsideration holding that the attorney's fees MRS 
is seeking to collect are incidental to the principal obligations owed by the defendants.14 In so 
holding, the District Court agreed with MRS "that contractual attorney's fees are an integral 
part of an underlying contract" but "disagrees with the argument made by MRS that being 
integral to the underlying contract is synonymous with being integral to the underlying 
obligation. IIlS MRS filed the Notice of Appeal on March 4, 2013. 16 
11 R Vol. I, p. 55. 
12 R Vol. I, p. 55. 
13 R Vol. I, pg. 59 (The Motion for Reconsideration is not part of the record but the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision references the Motion for Reconsideration). 
14 R Vol. I, p. 57. 
15 R Vol. I, p. 62. 
16 R Vol. I, p. 65. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because there were no answers filed in any of the cases appealed from and the 
Magistrate Court acted sua sponte in cutting the contractual attorney's fees sought on default 
judgment, the facts of this case contained in the record are limited. Each of the defendants 
signed a Patient Sign-In Form with Community Care which included a Promise to Pay section 
stating in relevant part that "I agree to pay as a reasonable attorney's fee $350 or 35% of the 
principal balance, whichever is greater, if my account is assigned to a collection agency and suit 
is filed to recover payment on my account." l7 Each of the defendants' accounts were then 
assigned to MRS who eventually filed suit to recover payment for the services the defendants 
had contracted to pay for but had not paid. MRS served each of the defendants with a 
Complaint and Summons and after the appropriate time had lapsed, MRS filed for entry of 
default judgment. MRS included as an exhibit to its Affidavit in Support of Application for 
Default Judgment, a copy of the contract each defendant had signed entitling Community Care, 
and in turn MRS as assignee, to collect attorney's fees of $350. 18 Ultimately, the magistrate and 
district courts held that I.e. § 26-2229A{4} prevented MRS from collecting the contractually 
agreed upon amount of attorney's fees. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Magistrate court commit reversible error when it did not award 
17 R Vol. I, p. 13. 
18 R Vol. I, p. 13. 
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attorney's fees on default in an amount agreed to by the parties pursuant to a written 
contract? 
2. Is Medical Recovery Services, LLC entitled to an award of attorney's fees on 
appeal under I.e. 12-120(1), (3) and (5) and I.A.R. 41? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURTS COMMIITED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO AWARD THE AMOUNT OF 
AITORNEY'S FEES THE PARTIES HAD CONTRACTUALLY AGREED UPON. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Whether MRS should be awarded the agreed upon amount of contractual attorney's 
fees depends on the interpretation of I.e. § 26-2229A(4). The Idaho Appellate Court has 
summarized the standard of review to be applied when deciding an award of attorney's fees 
based on the interpretation of statute as follows: 
When an award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the 
standard of review for statutory interpretation applies. Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 
Idaho 195, 196, 158 P.3d 971, 972 (2007). The interpretation of a statute is an issue of 
law over which we exercise free review. Zener v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352, 355,17 P.3d 
296, 299 (Ct.App.2000). When interpreting a statute, we will construe the statute as a 
whole to give effect to the legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 
118 Idaho 537,539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990); Zener, 135 Idaho at 355,17 P.3d 
at 299. The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Watkins Family, 118 
Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388; Zener, 135 Idaho at 355,17 P.3d at 299. 
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Action Collection Services, Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286 (Idaho App., 2008). 
B. Plaintiff Had A Legal Entitlement To Attorney Fees For The Amount The Parties Agreed 
To In A Written Contract. 
It is generally accepted that a court will not permit a party to avoid its contractual 
obligations. Smith v. Idaho State Federal Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680 (1988). When a contract 
is clear and unambiguous, courts are required to enforce the terms as written and cannot 
revise them in order to make it better for the parties. McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, 
141 Idaho 463 (2005). In Idaho, an attorney's fee agreement constitutes a valid contract. CUff 
v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686 (1993). Additionally, Idaho courts have held that when there is a valid 
contract between the parties which contains a provision for attorney's fees and costs, the 
terms of that provision establish a right to attorney's fees and costs. LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131 
Idaho 158 (1998). 
Further, at least one Idaho court, as well as courts of other jurisdictions, have held that 
where parties to a contract fix the amount of the attorney fees to be paid, it is presumed that 
the agreed amount is reasonable. See Wooten v. Dahlquist, 42 Idaho 121 (1926) (holding that 
trial court did not err in presuming that the $200 fixed amount of contractual attorney's fees 
was reasonable in the absence of evidence to the contrary); Government Street Lumber 
Company, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 553 So.2d 68 (Ala. 1989) (holding that trial court did not 
err in awarding amount of attorney's fees the parties expressly agreed to in a written 
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agreement); and McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Simmons, 165 P3d 667 
(Ariz. App. 2007) (holding that an agreement to pay a specified amount in attorney's fees 
establishes a prima facie entitlement to fees in the amount requested.) 
Here, the attorney's fee provisions are found in written contracts and provide that the 
defendants agreed "to pay as a reasonable attorney's fee $350 or 35% of the principal and 
interest on my account balance, whichever is greater, if my account is assigned to a collection 
agency and suit is filed to recover payment on my account.,,19 The language ofthe attorney's 
fee provisions are clear and unambiguous. The parties entered into agreements in which they 
formed valid contracts for attorney's fees. These contracts created a right to the amount of 
attorney's fees agreed upon in the contracts when the accounts were assigned for collections 
and suits were filed to recover payment, and the amount is presumed by law to be 
reasonable. 
e. Idaho Code Section 26-2229(A)(4) Does Not Apply To The Facts Of This Case. 
Although MRS is subject to the Idaho Collection Agency Act ("ICAA"), Idaho Code §§ 26-
2201 et. aI., I.e. § 26-2229A(4) is not applicable in this case because MRS, as assignee, is trying 
to enforce contracts between the debtors and medical service providers and not a contract 
between MRS and the debtors. I.e. § 26-2222 defines a licensee as "a person who has obtained 
a license under this act." MRS is a licensee under the act, but the underlying medical provider 
and party to the contracts, Community Care, is clearly not a licensee or person required to be 
19 R Vol. I, p. 13. 
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licensed under this act. I.e. § 26-2229A states in relevant part that: 
(1) Every licensee or person required to be licensed under this act and its agents shall 
deal openly, fairly, and honestly without deception in the conduct of its business 
activities in this state under this act. 
(2) When not inconsistent with the statutes of this state, the provisions of the federal 
fair debt collection practices act, 15 U.S.e. section 1692, et seq., as amended, may be 
enforced by the director against collection agencies licensed or required to be licensed 
under the provisions of this act. 
(4) No collection agency licensee, or collection agency required to be licensed under 
this act, or agent of such collection agency shall collect or attempt to collect any interest 
or other charges, fees, or expenses incidental to the principal obligation unless such 
interest or incidental fees, charges, or expenses: 
(a) Are expressly authorized by statute; 
(b) Are allowed by court ruling against the debtor; 
(c) Have been judicially determined; 
(d) Are provided for in a written form agreement, signed by both the debtor and the 
licensee, and which has the prior approval of the director with respect to the terms of 
the agreement and amounts of the fees, interest, charges and expenses; or 
I.e. § 26-2229A (Emphasis Added). 
In the cases now on appeal, Community Care, the medical service provider who 
contracted with the debtors is not a licensee as defined by the ICAA and the ICAA does not 
apply to the contract between Community Care and its patients. The ICAA does not apply to 
anyone but "licensees" under the act and does not create any legal requirements as to the 
content of contracts between medical providers and their patients. The attorney's fee 
provisions are found in the contracts between Community Care and the appellees and are part 
of the principal debt assigned to MRS. The District Court in its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration stated: 
The attorney fees, while an integral part of the contract, are subordinate to the 
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debt owing from the services provided by Community Care. In other words, the 
attorney fees are incidental to the principal obligation for purposes of Idaho Code § 26-
2229A(4). This Court agrees with MRS that contractual attorney fees are an integral 
part of the underlying contract. See Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326, 647 
P2d. 7, 782 (Ct. App. 1982) (liThe right to recover attorney fees is an integral part of the 
bank's entitlement under the guarant agreement."). However, this Court disagrees with 
the argument made by MRS that being integral to the underlying contract is 
synonymous with being integral to the underlying obligation.20 
The District Court does not explain how I.e. § 26-2229A(4) applies to Community Care 
who is not a licensee but instead apparently interprets that statute to mean that a collection 
agency cannot "collect" these fees for its client. However, other Idaho statutes and rules of 
procedure clearly conflict with this interpretation and allow collection agencies to collect 
attorney's fees. It is generally accepted in the state of Idaho and the practice of all magistrate 
courts, district courts, and the Supreme Court in the state of Idaho to award attorney's fees to 
collection agencies under I.e. §§ 12-120(1) & (3). Thus according to the reasoning ofthe lower 
courts in this case, all of these other courts, including this magistrate court who did award some 
attorney's fees, are improperly awarding attorney's fees in violation of I.e. § 26-2229A(4). 
Clearly, the intention and plain language of I.e. § 26-2229A(4) is to allow collection agencies 
and other licensees under the act to collect attorney's fees that are "expressly authorized by 
statute." Attorney's fees in the cases on appeal are awardable under I.e. §§ 12-120(1) and (3) 
and the amount is set pursuant to valid contracts between the Community Care and the 
debtors. Therefore, all the lower courts are really doing is holding that the parties to a contract 
20 R Vol. I, p. 62. 
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cannot set the amount of attorney's fees and improperly citing I.e. § 26-2229A(4) in support of 
this outcome. 
The lower courts fail to cite to or otherwise explain any authority under which they 
completely invalidate and rewrite Community Care's contract and seems to override the legal 
presumption that the contractual amount is reasonable. Because MRS, who is the licensee in 
this case, is not seeking any charges incidental to the principal but is only seeking to enforce the 
amount of the contractual debt, this court should enforce Community Care's contract which it 
assigned to MRS and award MRS the contractual fees sought. 
D. Court's Have Consistently Upheld And Enforced Similar Contractual Attorney's Fee 
Provisions Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 
MRS has been unable to locate even a single Idaho case which applies I.e. § 26-2229A(4) 
and will therefore rely on case law interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 
which is expressly adopted and incorporated as part of the Idaho Collection Agency Act 
{"ICAA")21 to show that similar contracts for attorney's fees are routinely upheld. In this regard, 
courts have held that contracts between the underlying creditor and debtor are enforceable by 
the collection agency to which the debt is assigned. See Shapiro v. Riddle & Associates, p.e, 
351 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2003)(Affirming district court's decision that it was not a violation of 
FDCPA to collect a contractual attorney fee on a contract between the underlying debtor and 
21 See I.e. § 26-2229A(2). 
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creditor.). One court explained that "once a debtor such as Bull agrees to pay attorneys' fees in 
the event of default, he cannot use the FDCPA to contest the reasonableness of those fees, 
which is precisely what Plaintiff seeks to do in this case. Stated differently, even if a court were 
to agree with Plaintiff that $3,900 is an unreasonable amount of attorneys' fees, Defendants 
demanding that amount in their collection complaint does not give rise to a claim under the 
FDCPA." Bull v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 444 F. Supp. 2d 946, 951 (N.D. Ind. 2006). 
In these cases, the defendants have not even objected to the contractual amount of 
fees but instead the court has on its own initiative raised the objection for the debtor. The 
court distinguishes these federal cases stating that lithe federal fair debt collection statute is 
inconsistent with the Idaho statute on this particular issue and thus any cases cited would be 
inapposite." The relevant language contained in the FDCPA states that lithe following conduct 
is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, 
charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly 
authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 15 U.S.CA. § 1692f 
(West)(Emphasis added). Clearly the contractual language at issue in these cases complies with 
15 U.S.CA. § 1692f as the contracts between Community Care and the debtors expressly 
authorize the fees. 
The ICAA permits collection agencies to collect fees that are authorized by statute, 
allowed by court ruling, have been judicially determined or are provided by a written 
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agreement signed by the licensee and the debtor and approved by the director.22 In this case, 
the attorney's fees sought are allowable per statute as explained above, by court ruling because 
the courts of Idaho routinely uphold contracts for attorney's fees, and because the contractual 
provision at issue is between the creditor and debtor and not between the collection agency 
and debtor. Because contractual attorney's fee provisions have routinely been upheld in 
FDCPA cases, this court should award MRS the contractual attorney's fees it seeks in this case 
as MRS is not in violation of the FDCPA or the ICAA. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETS I.e. § 26-2229A(4) AND THIS IMPROPER 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION RENDERS I.e. § 26-2229A(4) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Court has explained the standard of review to apply when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute. This Court has stated that 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197,969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998); 
Fremont-Madison Irr. Dist. and Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, 
Inc., 129 Idaho 454, 926 P.2d 1301 (1996). The party challenging a statute on 
constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute is 
unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." Olsen v. l.A. 
Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990). Courts are obligated to 
seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. State v. Newman, 
108 Idaho 5, 13, 696 P.2d 856,864 (1985). The judicial power to declare legislative 
22 See I.e. * 26-2229A(4). 
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action invalid upon constitutional grounds is to be exercised only in clear cases. State ex 
reI. Brossey v. Hanson, 81 Idaho 403, 406, 342 P.2d 706, 709 (1959). 
Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 540 (2004). 
B. The Lower Courts' Interpretation of I.e. § 26-2229A(4) Would Render That Statute 
Unconstitutional As A Law Impairing The Obligation of Contracts. 
The United States Constitution Article 1, § 10, cl. 1 states: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and 
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or 
Law impairing the Obligation 0/ Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cI. l(Emphasis added). The Constitution of the State of Idaho at Article 1, 
§ 16 states that "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation 0/ 
contracts shall ever be passed." Idaho Const. art. I, § 16 (Emphasis added). Idaho Courts have 
explained: 
An attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho law, and 
appellants performed services for their clients in reliance on the terms of the fee 
agreements. It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a contract have a property interest in the 
subject matter of the contract that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and 
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 691-92, 864 P.2d 132,137-38 (1993). "Further, a law which in its 
operation denies or obstructs any rights accruing under a contract is a violation of Idaho's 
constitutional provision prohibiting any laws which impair the "obligation of contract." Curtis v. 
Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 610, 850 P.2d 749, 761 (1993). 
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Idaho courts have consistently held that "where there is a valid contract between the 
parties which contains a provision for an award of attorney fees and costs, the terms of that 
contractual provision establish a right to an award of attorney fees and costs." Lamprecht v. 
Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187 (2003) (emphasis added); and Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. 
Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 569 (1992). See also Lease First v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158, 163 (1998) 
(holding that a party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees where lithe terms of that 
contractual provision establish a right to an award of attorney fees and costs.") Attorney's fee 
provisions in contracts are "an integral part" of a party's entitlement under the provisions of an 
agreement. Bonk of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326, (Ct. App. 1982). Court's cannot treat 
attorney's fees provisions differently than the obligation to pay the contractual debt. Id. 
The right to attorney's fees based on a contract is so well defined that a trial court cannot even 
award attorney's fees based on a statute when "a valid agreement between the parties 
specifically limits the dollar amount that may be claimed and awarded." Chittenden & Eastman 
Co. v. Leasure, 116 Idaho 981, 982 (Ct. App. 1989). The rationale for this rule is that "the 
freedom of contract ... is fa fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts and is an 
essential element of the free enterprise system." Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 452 
(2009). 
In these cases, Community Care had a valid contract which contained a provision for 
attorney's fees which established a right to an award of the contractually agreed upon 
attorney's fees. The District Court found that "I.e. § 26-2229A(4) plainly prohibits MRS from 
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collecting any fees, which are incidental to the principal obligation."23 MRS agrees. However, 
the contracts between the debtors and the original service provider, Community Care, contain 
a provision in which the debtors agreed to "pay [Community Care] as a reasonable attorney's 
fee $350 or 35% of the principal and interest on my account balance, whichever is greater, if my 
account is assigned to a collection agency and suit is filed to recover payment on my account.,,24 
This contractual provision gives Community Care the contractual right to $350 or 35% ofthe 
principal and interest as a contractual attorney fee, which predates any assignment or interest 
MRS obtained in the accounts. 
Because contractual provisions for attorney's fees are "integral clauses" in contracts and 
should not be treated any differently than any other obligations created by contract, the 
attorney's fees MRS seeks are part of the principal obligation owing to Community Care, not 
MRS. When Community Care assigned the contracts to MRS to file suit, Community Care 
conferred a complete and present right in the contracts to MRS, which included the debtor's 
obligation to pay Community Care contractual attorney's fees. Accordingly, MRS has not added 
any charges, fees, or expenses incidental to the principal obligation but seeks to collect the 
amount of contractual debt Community Care has assigned to it. Therefore, MRS is not 
collecting or attempting to collect any "fees incidental to the principal obligation," and I.e. § 26-
23 R Vol. I, p. 5l. 
24 R Vol. I, p. 13. 
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229A(4) does not apply to preclude MRS from recovering the contractually agreed upon 
amount as attorney's fees on the principal obligation. 
The underlying rationale for the rule regarding contractual attorney's fees underscores 
the point in this case. As explained above, recovering attorney's fees as part of a contractual 
obligation is "within the freedom of contract" and "an essential element of the free enterprise 
system." Community Care extended credit to the debtors in exchange for which Community 
Care obtained a contractual term that the debtors agreed to pay a contractual amount to 
Community Care for attorney's fees if Community Care assigned an account to collections. No 
evidence exists that this transaction was anything other than an arm's length bargained for 
transaction between Community Care and the debtors. This important "free enterprise" 
exchange resulting in a contractual obligation for attorney's fees took place between 
Community Care and the debtors months before MRS ever even got involved. Ifthis Court 
were to deny Community Care its contractual right to attorney's fees, this Court would deny 
Community Care good and valuable consideration it bargained for in extending credit to the 
debtors who, as it turns out, were not good credit risks, further underscoring the very reason 
Community Care bargained for and obtained an attorney's fees provision for accounts turned 
over for collections. Accordingly, MRS is not collecting any fees, which are incidental to the 
principal obligation, but collecting part of the principal obligation itself. 
Finally, the purpose of I.e. § 26-2229A(4) does not apply here in this bargained for 
exchange between Community Care and the debtors. The purpose of the rule is to protect 
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debtors from collection agencies with whom the debtors have no ability to bargain at arm's 
length as part of a free enterprise system. For example, if a debtor owes an assigned debt of 
$500 to a collection agency, the debtor has no ability to walk away from the transaction. He 
owes the money and is presumably pinched to pay it without a garnishment. If the collection 
agency says it will take payments, but charges a $15 a month service fee, the debtor can do 
nothing about it. If the collection agency says it will take credit card payments, but charges a 
$10 fee per transaction, the debtor can do nothing about it. Or if the collection agency charges 
a monthly reminder fee, a statement fee, or any other incidental fee, the debtor can do nothing 
about it. Thus, the rule is aimed at protecting debtors from incurring collection agency fees 
which the debtor has no power to avoid. This picture contrasts sharply with the debtor who, as 
here, agrees to receive credit and medical services as part of an arm's length transaction. Ifthe 
debtor did not want the medical services, he could have done something about it: gone 
elsewhere for treatment. This is especially true given that Community Care does not render 
"emergency room" services making the services simply primary care services. 
The lower courts in these cases have completely disregarded Community Care's right to 
contract by not awarding MRS the contractually agreed upon attorney's fees. By 
misinterpreting I.e. § 26-2229A(4) the lower courts' decision would render I.e. § 26-2229A(4) 
unconstitutional as it would impair Community Care's freedom to contract. 
e. The Lower Courts' Interpretation of I.e. § 26-2229A(4) Would Render That Statute 
Unconstitutional As A Violation of Community Care's Equal Protection. 
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Both article 1 § 2 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to United 
States Constitution provide all people with equal protection and benefit of the law. Idaho 
courts have explained that "[t]he principle underlying the equal protection clauses of both the 
Idaho and United States Constitutions is that all persons in like circumstances should receive 
the same benefits and burdens of the law." Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, Dept. of 
Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 1003-04, (1989); See also, Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. 
Bender, 95 Idaho 813,520 P.2d 860 (1974); and State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 725 P.2d 202 
(Ct.App.1986). In determining the standard of review to apply to equal protection analysis, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has explained: 
"In any equal protection analysis, the Court must: (1) identify the classification at 
issue; (2) determine the standard of review to apply; and (3) apply the standard. Strict 
scrutiny applies where the classification is based upon a suspect class (such as race) or 
involves a fundamental right. Idaho Courts use the "means focus" test where the 
classification is discriminatory on its face and clearly bears no relationship to the 
statute's declared purpose. Finally, the rational basis test applies in all other situations. 
In order to survive rational basis review, the statutory classification must "bear a 
rational relationship to [a] legitimate government interest." 
Aeschliman v. Stote, 132 Idaho 397, 401, 973 P.2d 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1999)(lnternal citations 
omitted). 
In this case, the lower courts' interpretation of I.e. § 26-2229A(4) does not involve a 
suspect class and this court should review the magistrate's decision using a rational basis 
review. MRS does not argue that this statute is unconstitutional on its face but only that the 
lower courts have applied the statute in violation of the equal protection clause. Essentially, if 
the lower courts' rulings are upheld, the outcome would be that the laws would apply 
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differently to "licensees" under the ICAA. For example, under the lower courts' analysis, 
Community Care would be able to directly hire a law firm to collect on its contractual debt and 
the law firm could collect the contractual attorney's fees. However, if Community Care decides 
to hire a collection agency to collect the debt and the agency finds it necessary to file suit, the 
collection agency could not collect the contractual attorney's fees. The effect of this unequal 
protection or burden of the law is that fewer creditors would use a collection agency to collect 
debts because in order to recover attorney's fees the creditors would have to hire an attorney 
and file law suits against their patients, customers or clients directly. This could not have been 
the intention of the legislature and is not what I.C § 26-2229A(4) actually states on its face. 
Although the ICAA does not have a purpose section, the FDCPA states that "[i]t is the purpose 
of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure 
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers 
against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.CA. § 1692. The magistrate court's interpretation of 
I.C § 26-2229A does not rationally relate to this stated purpose but would only create different 
burdens on collection agencies compared to attorney's or other similarly situated debt 
collectors. Therefore, because there is no rational basis reasonably related to a legitimate 
government objective, the magistrate court's interpretation of I.C § 26-2229A would render it 
unconstitutional as applied. 
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III. 
MRS IS ENTITLED TO AITORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 allows an award of costs lias a matter of course to the prevailing 
party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." I.A.R. 40(a). MRS is entitled to 
attorneys fees and costs pursuant I.e. 12-120(1), I.e. 12-120(3), I.A.R. 40 and I.A.R 41. Because 
the matter in dispute was less than $25,000, MRS demanded payment in writing from the 
defendants more than 10 days before filing suit and because MRS was attempting to collect on 
an open account, account stated, or contract relating to the purchase of services MRS was 
entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs. Accordingly, MRS should be entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees under Idaho Code Sections 12-120(1) and 12-120(3), Idaho Appellate Rule 41 
and costs under Idaho Appellate Rule 40 if this Court finds MRS to be the prevailing party on 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregOing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Appeal and the District Court's Memorandum and Order Re: Motion for 
Reconsideration affirming the decision of the magistrate court to reduce the contractually 
agreed upon attorney's fees with instructions for the magistrate court to award MRS the 
contractually agreed upon attorney's fees. 
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RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this 
-1-........... -
of August, 2013. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 24 
F :\CLI ENTS\BDS\Collection s\M RS\Files\ 7341.07361 \Pleadi ngs\130730 Appellate Brief.docx 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, 
r;JA" 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _-..:..t;_J_'Clay of August, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the forgoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a 
sealed envelope and depositing it in the u.s. Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
/ [,j] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
] U.s. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Stephanie and Jason Strawn 
248 Valley Dr 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Brandon and Renee Lewis 
1142 E 21st Street 
Idaho Fails, ID 83404 
Joseph Knight 
1542 Laprele St. Apt 53 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 25 
F:\CL!ENTS\BDS\Co!lections\MRS\Files\7341.07361\Pleading$\130730 Appellate Brief.docx 
